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Employers are held vicariously liable for the delicts committed by their employees 
where such delicts caused loss/harm to a person. Vicarious liability is strict liability, 
ie there is no need to prove fault on the side of the employer.1 Although the South 
African legal system is primarily based on Roman-Dutch law, English law has had a 
profound impact in various fields of the law. Vicarious liability is one of those fields, 
as is company law. 
Generally speaking, employers are held liable for the harm caused by their 
employees during the course and scope of their employment duties for their 
employers. The aforementioned statement raises three questions for the purposes of 
this article: when is a person an employer, when is a person an employee and when 
did a person act in the course and scope of his/her duties of employment? The first 
two questions seek to determine whether an employment relationship existed, and 
within the context of this article, ask whether it would suffice to establish vicarious 
liability for the employer. The question of whether the person who is alleged to be 
an employee acted within the course and scope of his or her duty may or may not 
become relevant.
This article focuses on the scenario where a holding company appoints directors, 
who are employees of the holding company, on the board of its subsidiary company. 
These directors may breach their duty of care and skill to the subsidiary which 
causes loss to the subsidiary. The subsidiary may want to recover these losses but 
the directors would be out of pocket and the subsidiary would want to hold the 
holding company liable for the losses caused by the directors which the holding 
company appointed. The article will focus on South African law, but as will be seen, 
the South African law of vicarious liability has been heavily influenced by English 
and Canadian law, which in turn also influenced Australian and New Zealand law. 
2 Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd2
The basis for this article is the decision in Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual 
Life Nominees Ltd, which was heard by the privy council on 21 May 1990. The case 
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dealt with jurisdictional matters but also the possible vicarious liability of Kuwait 
Asia Bank. The facts were that the bank held 49.9 per cent of the shares in Australasia 
Investment Corporation Ltd (AICL). AICL held between 75 per cent and 81 per cent 
of the shares in AIC Corporation, which in turn held all the shares in AIC Securities 
Ltd (AICS). Although it was therefore not a holding company legally speaking, one 
could certainly see that the bank was a de facto holding company of AICS.
The business of AICS was that of a money broker, which among other things 
entailed the taking of deposits. To comply with New Zealand statutory regulations, 
National Mutual Life Nominees were appointed as trustees for the depositors. 
National Mutual Life Nominees bound themselves contractually to AICS to furnish 
it with monthly and quarterly certificates.
AICS went insolvent, was liquidated and its unsecured depositors were unable to 
recover their full deposits from AICS. A class action was brought against National 
Mutual Life Nominees for breach of trust – ie that they failed to perform their 
duties as trustees of the deposits with the necessary diligence and competence. 
National Mutual Life Nominees settled with the aggrieved depositors and then 
sought contributions from various parties, including Kuwait Asia Bank as well as 
the directors appointed by the bank. The case of National Mutual Life Nominees 
against Kuwait Asia Bank was that the bank was vicariously liable for the failure 
of the trustees appointed by the bank to perform their duties with the necessary 
diligence and competence. National Mutual Life Nominees based their claim on the 
allegation that this failure by these appointees was committed in the course of their 
employment and that the bank was therefore liable for those acts or omissions as 
the employer of these trustees. The bank appointed the two directors to the board of 
AICS and they acted according to the directions of the bank, it was alleged.
The privy council stated that in the absence of any fraud or bad faith, a shareholder 
or another person who controls the appointment of a director owes no duty to the 
creditors of the company to take reasonable care to ensure that the appointees 
comply with their duties of diligence and competence.3 The privy council stated:
“One shareholder may lock away his paid up shares and go to sleep. Another shareholder may 
take an active interest in the company, insist on detailed information and deluge the directors with 
advice. This active shareholder is no more liable than the sleeping shareholder.”4
The privy council further stated that shareholders could be confronted with 
unlimited liability if they were held liable for the conduct of the directors appointed 
by them. It is true that it would be in the interest of the shareholder to ensure that 
the appointed directors act with the necessary competence, but this interest stems 
from self-interest and not because of any duty that exists between the shareholder 
and the director. The fact that the directors who were appointed by the shareholder 
are employees of the shareholder makes no difference. The breach of duty of the 
directors in casu were as directors of AICS, as individuals and not as employees 
of the bank. Although the directors who were appointed by the bank fulfilled their 
responsibilities on the board of AICS during their working hours in the bank and at 
the bank’s expense, and although the directors fulfilled their duties in the interest of 
the bank, this would not render the bank liable for the breach of the two directors. As 
directors the two directors were supposed to ignore the interests and wishes of the 
bank. They could therefore not raise a defence that they acted upon the instructions 
3 par 221.
4 par 221.
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of the bank as a defence to the allegation that they were in breach of their duties.5 
This would be a breach of the fiduciary duty not to fetter one’s discretion. 
The privy council further held that if the bank exploited its position as employer 
to obtain an improper advantage for the bank or to cause harm to National Mutual 
Life Nominees, it would be liable for its own misconduct. This was not the case in 
this matter. Although the bank may have had the opportunity to cause harm to AICS 
through its employees on the board of AICS, the council held that this would not 
lead to liability of the bank for the negligence of the two directors in the discharge 
of their duties.6
This case was decided in 1990 by the privy council. The question now is whether 
the law of vicarious liability has developed or changed in the intervening 28 years in 
a way that may lead to a different conclusion. To determine this the law of vicarious 
liability will be considered next.
3 Vicarious liability
As mentioned above, employers are held vicariously liable for any delicts which 
are committed by employees during the course and scope of their employment 
duties. Loubser et al refer to a number of theories which argue for this form of strict 
liability. Traditionally, the control test was used as justification, but in modern times 
this argument is less convincing because employers do not always exercise control 
over employees. Public policy and convenience are also held up as justification. 
Employers also have deeper pockets than the employee who wronged a person and 
furthermore they can absorb risk better than employees because they could take 
out insurance against the harm caused by employees more cost-effectively than 
employees. There is also the moral argument that it is only fair that the employer 
should be liable where the employee caused loss while pursuing a benefit for the 
employer. In light of the fact that the employer enjoys the benefit of the employee’s 
service, the employer should conversely bear the consequences of the delicts of the 
employee. Ancillary to this argument is the “creation of risk” argument in terms of 
which employers create a risk that third parties may suffer loss during the course of 
the employee’s service to promote the business of the employer. It would therefore 
only be fair that the employer should be held liable.7
Factual scenarios in case law dealing with vicarious liability have become more 
and more complex in light of the more traditional reasons justifying vicarious 
liability. In bygone eras employees were more prone to direct control of their 
employers. Employment has, however, changed significantly in the technological 
age and direct control is not easy to ascertain. A large number of recent international 
cases specifically deals with abuse, for example the abuse of schoolchildren by 
teachers or those employed to supervise children, priests abusing children while 
under their care and in South Africa delicts committed by the police force when on 
duty, which will be referred to below.
In K v Minister of Safety and Security
8 K was raped by three on-duty uniformed 
policemen after she found herself stranded in the early morning hours following a 




7 Loubser et al (n 1) 384.
8 2005 6 SA 419 (CC).
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She walked to a nearby petrol station to call her mother to fetch her. A police vehicle 
pulled up at the petrol station and the three policemen offered to take her home. The 
policemen proceeded to rape her on the way. K instituted civil action against the 
state. The state admitted that the policemen were on duty and that they had a duty 
to ensure the safety of members of the public. It was also accepted by all the parties 
that policemen may not transport unauthorised people in police vehicles. On appeal, 
the supreme court of appeal found that the principles of vicarious liability as they 
were then did not allow for liability for the state. The court held that there was such 
a deviation from what the employment of the policemen entails that there could not 
be any liability. 
K appealed to the constitutional court and argued that the supreme court of appeal 
applied the common-law rule for vicarious liability incorrectly; in the alternative, if 
it did apply it correctly that the constitutional court should develop the common-law 
rule in light of the spirit, purport and objects of the constitution. The constitutional 
argument was based on the premise that if the state is not liable for K’s damages 
in terms of the common-law rule, the rule should be developed in light of K’s 
constitutional right to freedom and security, in particular the right to be free from 
all forms of violence from either public or private sources. The question firstly for 
the court was what was meant by development of the common law. In the end the 
court held that there was a constitutional principle involved, especially in light of 
the constitutional duty of the police to ensure the safety and security of all citizens 
and to prevent crime.
The constitutional court first considered the common-law principles of vicarious 
liability. The general principle, as mentioned above, is that the employer is liable for 
the wrongs committed by an employee during the course of employment. The court 
then looked at those cases where there is an intentional deviation from the normal 
employee duties. Furthermore, the court referred to the traditional test laid out in 
Minister of Police v Rabie,9 where an off-duty policeman in plain clothes made 
a wrongful arrest after identifying himself as a policeman and taking the victim 
to the police station, where the victim was detained and assaulted. The arrest and 
detention were purely in pursuance of the policeman’s own interests. The question 
was whether the minister of police, as employer, was vicariously liable. The majority 
of the appellate division formulated the following test:
“It seems clear that an act done by a servant solely for his own interests and purposes, although 
occasioned by his employment, may fall outside the course or scope of his employment, and that in 
deciding whether an act by the servant does so fall, some reference is to be made to the servant’s 
intention. … The test is in this regard subjective. On the other hand, if there is nevertheless a 
sufficiently close link between the servant’s acts for his own interests and purposes and the business 
of his master, the master may yet be liable. This is an objective test.”10
The test is therefore a two-stage one. Even if the act was purely for the purposes of 
the employee, the second stage objectively enquires whether there is a sufficiently 
close link between the employee’s acts for his own interest and the purposes and 
business of the employer.11 The court then considered foreign law as enabled by 
the constitution despite protestations by the state that our law of delict, which is 
conceptually based, differs from the casuistic nature of the law of torts in common-
law countries.
9 1986 1 SA 117 (A).
10 134C-E.
11 the K case (n 8) par 32.
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The constitutional court looked at the well-known cases of Lister v Hesley Hall,12 
Bazley v Curry
13 and Jacobi  v  Griffiths.14 In the Lister case a warden sexually 
abused schoolboys. The school was held vicariously liable for the conduct of the 
warden even though there was a gross deviation from his employment duties. Lord 
Steyn established the test of whether the tort was so closely connected with the 
employment that it would be fair and just to hold the employer vicariously liable.
The two Canadian cases dealt with the liability of employers for the sexual assault 
of their employees on children who were in their care. In the Bazley case it concerned 
a non-profit organisation as employer. The supreme court held the employer liable. 
The court took cognisance of the fact that the business of the employer created and 
fostered the risk that led to the harm. The abuse was not just an accident of time and 
place, but the product of a special relationship of intimacy and respect the employer 
fostered as well as the special opportunities for exploitation of that relationship it 
furnished.15
In the Jacobi case, which also dealt with the sexual abuse of children, the 
employer was not liable on the facts. Here the employee abused children in his 
home away from the club where he was employed. Here the court held that there 
was not a sufficient connection between the employment and the wrongs. In the 
Jacobi case reliance was placed on the case of Primeaux v United States, where an 
off-duty policeman, who returned home from a work seminar in his government 
vehicle, offered a lift to a woman walking in the road, whereafter he raped her. 
In the Primeaux case the court held that the officer was unarmed, out of uniform 
and off-duty. The majority (six to five) held that the connection between the wrong 
and the employment duties was too remote and tenuous to be foreseeable for the 
employer. The minority of five focused on the fact that he was on his way back from 
a work seminar, received payment for fuel and a daily allowance and was authorised 
to drive an official vehicle. His red lights were on when he stopped to offer the lift, 
and it was part of his duties to offer stranded motorists a ride.
The constitutional court in the K case sees very close parallels between the 
Rabie test in South Africa and the United Kingdom test. The Canadian test is also 
an objective test as in the second leg of the enquiry according to the Rabie test. 
The constitutional court also looked at the argument that the policemen failed to 
protect K by raping her. The wrongful act by the policemen was simultaneously a 
commission (the rape) and an omission (the failure to protect K). The court agreed 
with this argument that an employee could simultaneously be committing a delict 
which was a deviation from his duties but it was also an omission to not perform 
his duties as a policeman. Ultimately a sufficiently close connection was established 
and the minister of police was held vicariously liable. It is important to bear in mind 
that in the K case the question was about whether the policemen acted “in the course 
of employment”. Whether or not they were employees was not in question.
In F v Minister of Safety and Security
16 the constitutional court again had to 
deal with the rape by a policeman of a woman who was stranded. In this case the 
policeman was off-duty. The court found a sufficiently close link (the police vehicle 
facilitated the rape and the victim placed her trust in the policeman). Another judge 
concurred with the judgment but held that the state was directly liable and not 
12 2002 1 AC 215 (HL).
13 1999 2 SCR 534.
14 1999 2 SCR 570.
15 the Bazley case (n 13) par 58.
16 2012 1 SA 536 (CC).
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vicariously liable because the actions of the policemen were in fact the actions of 
the state – the so called non-delegable duties. Again the question in this matter as 
not whether the policeman was an employee but whether he acted in the course of 
his employment.
Before I evaluate the Kuwait Bank case against these more recent cases of vicarious 
liability, two more South African cases will be discussed. These cases have not 
received any discussion from academics but they are in my opinion important for 
the evaluation later.
The first case is Van der Berg v Coopers and Lybrand Trust (Pty) Ltd.17 In 
this case, Mrs Fey and Mr Lane were joint trustees in the insolvent estate of one 
Harksen. Fey was an employee of Coopers and Lybrand and Lane was an employee 
and director of Republic Trustees. Lane and Fey made defamatory statements about 
Van der Berg in civil proceedings. Van der Berg sought damages against Lane and 
Fey for these defamatory statements but also included Coopers and Lybrand and 
Republic Trustees in his claim for damages, basing his claim against them upon 
vicarious liability. Coopers and Lybrand accepted that they were vicariously liable 
but Republic Trustees opposed the action. The facts were that Lane and James 
were the directors of Republic Trustees. The directors and employees of Republic 
Trustees accepted appointments as trustees of insolvent estates and as liquidators of 
companies being wound up. It also provided administrative and secretarial support 
to their directors and employees in the performance of their duties as trustees and 
liquidators and the fees earned by the directors and employees in their capacities as 
trustees and liquidators were paid to Republic Trustees.
The argument of Republic was that when Lane acted as a trustee, he did not act 
subject to the control of his employer. The argument went further that even if Lane 
was an employee and not only a director, he performed statutory duties which were 
imposed on him personally by the Insolvency Act18 and that subsequently he acted 
under the control of the creditors of the insolvent estate and the master of the high 
court. Furthermore, the very nature of his statutory duties and functions meant that 
Republic Trustees could not exercise any control over his activities and that therefore 
he could not be regarded as their servant. The court referred to the long line of 
cases involving policemen but failed to refer to the Rabie case. Instead it referred 
to Midway Two Engineering & Construction Services v Transnet Bpk,19 where 
the court preferred a broader multi-faceted test that took into account all relevant 
factors, including questions of policy and fairness, to determine the question of 
vicarious liability. Such circumstances could be the nature of the work, the manner 
of payment, the manner of performing the work, the relationship between the parties 
and dependence, the power to give instructions, use of the employer’s infrastructure 
and whether the person and the work form an integral part of the business.20
In the Van der Berg case the relationship between Lane and Republic was 
contractual in nature. The court focused on the fact that his remuneration for his 
services was paid to Republic and that he used the infrastructure of Republic 
Trustees to enable him to fulfil his duties. The court held that Lane was not only 
carrying out his duties as a trustee but that he was also busy carrying out functions 
on behalf of Republic Trustees and for their benefit. There was an obligation on 
Republic Trustees to show that in the fulfilment of his duties as trustee, he was taken 
17 2001 2 SA 242 (SCA).
18 24 of 1936.
19 1998 3 SA 17 (SCA).
20 Loubser et al (n 1) 385.
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out of the realm as employee for the time being. This they failed to show. According 
to the court the delict (defamation) was committed within the course and scope of 
Lane’s employment by Republic Trustees.
The second case is that of Public Investment Corporation Ltd v Bodigelo.21 The 
PIC appointed Bodigelo to serve as a non-executive director on a number of boards 
of companies in which it invested. The companies paid directors’ fees and bonuses 
for the services rendered by non-executive services and in the case of Bodigelo it 
was paid to the PIC upon the instructions of the PIC. It is important to note that this 
case was decided under the Companies Act of 1973. In terms of the 2008 Companies 
Act, the memorandum of incorporation constitutes a contract between a director 
and the company. Under the 1973 act this was not the case. If the memorandum 
under the old act granted rights to a director, the director could not enforce these 
unless there was a separate agreement between the company and the director. There 
is, however, no indication in the case whether the payment of the fees and bonuses 
was in terms of the memorandum of incorporation. The PIC alleged that Bodigelo 
was not entitled to the payment because he performed his functions as a director in 
the relevant companies as a nominee and employee of the PIC. What is interesting in 
this case is not the fact that Bodigelo could not show a basis for his claim (he failed 
to show an underlying contract entitling him to the fees) but that the PIC was entitled 
to the payment. The court held that Bodigelo performed his duties as an employee 
of the PIC and could not show a basis for his claim to the fees. The judgment is 
alarming, because shareholders are not entitled to the fees of directors, but, more 
importantly, by stating that Bodigelo fulfilled his duties on the boards of the relevant 
companies as an employee of the PIC, the court opened up the possibility that should 
Bodigelo have wronged the relevant companies, that they would be able to hold the 
PIC vicariously liable for these wrongs.
4 Evaluation 
The majority of decided cases on vicarious liability appear to be in the cases of 
abuse by persons in authority, and it would appear that courts are moving more 
towards direct liability in those cases – ie that the employer is held to be liable for 
his own delict instead of being liable for the delict of the employee. It would also 
appear that what constitutes “during the scope of employment” has evolved and has 
become a much more fluid concept, even extending to those cases where employees 
of independent contractors could be viewed as employees of the employer. Do these 
cases however have any value for the purposes of corporate law?
Loubser et al state that there are cases other than the employer-employee 
relationship which give rise to vicarious liability. They state that a partnership could 
be vicariously liable for a partner’s delict depending on the capacity in which the 
partner acted. A principal could also be liable for the delicts of his agent if the agent 
acted within his authority or, where the agent is an employee, he acted within the 
course and scope of his employment.22 The other trite example is that of the owner of 
a motor vehicle who allows another to drive the vehicle. Wagener lists similar cases 
where other relationships may give rise to vicarious liability.23 Wagener states that 
there are de facto employment relationships which gave rise to vicarious liability. 
21 (128/2013) 2013 ZASCA 156 (22 Nov 2013).
22 Loubser et al (n 1) 385.
23 Wagener “The relationship(s) giving rise to vicarious liability in South African Law” 2014 SALJ 
178-204. 
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These include examples where the South African government could be held liable 
when a cabinet minister defamed a person as in Mangope v Asmal.24 The court held 
that the minister was under the control of the government and his actions were in 
the furtherance of the interests of the government.25 Schools and universities could 
also be held liable in some cases where prefects or students act as functionaries of 
the university.26 In Nathan v Dollars & Sense Ltd27 the New Zealand supreme court 
held a principal vicariously liable for the tort of the agent despite the absence of an 
employment relationship.
Morgan28 discusses whether holding companies should be vicariously liable 
for the torts of a subsidiary. His argument is premised on the employment-like 
relationship between the holding company and the subsidiary. He refers to some 
of the abuse cases where there was no employment relationship but relationships 
similar to employment. Typically these would be the cases also highlighted by 
Wagener above29 as well as those cases where a company contracts out certain 
services to an independent contractor whose employees then harm a third party. 
Although the independent contractor was the employer, in some cases the company 
was held liable. One should be mindful of these cases, though. In South Africa if 
liability is imposed on the company the courts have been more inclined to hold the 
company directly liable for the harm suffered by the third party and not based on 
vicarious liability.30
Morgan uses the judgment in Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare 
Society
31 for his argument. There the court held that an employment relationship was 
not required for vicarious liability but that a relationship similar to an employment 
relationship would suffice. Morgan focuses on the fact that the court in the case 
referred to insurance and loss-spreading, deep pockets, control and enterprise and 
risk creation as justification for an expanded view for vicarious liability.32 I am not 
going to dwell on his argument, because it is not necessarily what I am discussing. 
His theory also poses difficulty because a company can only act through natural 
persons, as he acknowledges. If the employee of the subsidiary commits a delict, 
it is the employer subsidiary that is vicariously liable and to then hold the holding 
company also vicariously liable would mean double vicarious liability. Morgan 
however argues that there are cases where the holding company assumes a duty of 
care towards a victim and the individual wrongdoer does not incur liability.33 The 
problem with this argument is that the company is directly liable, not vicariously.
I do not think that the argument of Morgan should be easily dismissed. However, 
instead of looking at the delict of the subsidiary, my aim is rather to consider the 
delict committed by the director appointed by the holding company on the board of 
the subsidiary and which then causes loss. For this one has to look at the relationship 
24 1997 4 SA 277 (T).
25 Wagener (n 23) 184-185.
26 See Dowling v Diocesan College 1999 3 SA 847 (C). See further Gibbins v Williams, Muller, Wright 
and Mostert Ingelyf 1987 2 SA 82 (T).
27 2008 2 NZLR 577. See further Watson and Noonan “The widening gyre of vicarious liability” 2009 
Torts Law Journal 144.
28 Morgan “Vicarious liability for group companies: the final frontier of vicarious liability?” 2015 
Journal of Professional Negligence 276-299.
29 n 26 above.
30 See Stein v Rising Tide Productions CC 2002 5 SA 199 (C); Langley Fox Building Partnership (Pty) 
Ltd v De Valence 1991 1 SA 1 (A) 11; Chartaprops 16 (Pty) Ltd v Silberman 2009 1 SA 265 (SCA).
31 2012 UKSC 56; 2013 2 AC 1.
32 Morgan (n 28) 289-294.
33 298.
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that exists between the holding company and the director. In the chosen scenario, 
as in the Kuwait Bank case, the director is an employee of the holding company 
and that is therefore not in issue. The issue is whether the director when serving on 
the board of the subsidiary company, and is in breach of his duty of care, skill and 
diligence, acts in the course and scope of his employment by the holding company.
It is trite that companies have at least two distinct organs of power, the shareholders 
and the board of directors. At the inception of company law, power vested in the 
shareholders of the company. This however gradually changed as the board became 
more powerful due to practical reasons.34 In larger public companies with a 
diverse group of shareholders, the distinction between management and control of 
a company became more apparent. In the Companies Act 71 of 2008, the board is 
vested with the default power35 and shareholder power has been reduced to that of 
dismissing a director,36 effecting amendments to the constitutional documents37 of 
a company or voting on fundamental transactions.38 
Although it was not necessarily envisaged in the 1850s when company law 
effectively started, companies are entitled to hold shares in other companies – hence 
groups of companies.
39 As mentioned above, shareholders are entitled to appoint 
directors to the boards of companies in which they hold shares. A natural person 
shareholder who holds shares in multiple companies may not be able to serve on 
all the boards of the companies in which he holds shares. This is equally true for 
a company that holds shares in another, especially where it is a holding company. 
This is especially true where juristic persons are not allowed to be directors of a 
company as is the case in South African law, where the idea of a shadow director 
never really existed. Whether that company could be a de facto director is also a 
difficult argument to make, as I have expanded on elsewhere.40 In order to exercise 
the necessary control over the subsidiary, a controlling juristic person will therefore 
have to appoint directors to the board of the subsidiary.
What is the relationship between shareholder and director, though? Before we 
look at that, it should be noted that shareholders are able to appoint proxies to attend 
shareholder meetings on their behalf and vote on their behalf, even sometimes 
using their discretion. The relationship between shareholder and proxy is clearly 
one of agency. Also, where a shareholder holds his shares through a nominee the 
relationship is purely that of agency. A director of a company is however not the 
agent of the appointing shareholder. The reason for this is that directors have duties 
to the company which trump any duty to a shareholder. The duty to exercise an 
unfettered discretion is well known, although this rule has been slightly tempered 
in Australia and New Zealand. The director of the subsidiary has to always exercise 
his discretion in an unfettered manner and as a general rule cannot contract with 
his appointer as to how he will vote.41 Such an agreement may be against public 
34 Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate v Cuninghame 1906 2 Ch 34 (CA); Gramophone Typewriter 





39 Stevens The External Relations of Company Groups in South African Law: A Critical Comparative 
Analysis (2011 dissertation US) 13; Muscat The Liability of the Holding Company for the Debts of its 
Insolvent Subsidiaries (1996) 1.
40 Stevens “Liability within company groups” 2016 TSAR 709 715-716.
41 See Keay Directors’ Duties (2014) 184-185; Thorby v Goldberg 1964 112 CLR 597; Fulham Football 
Club Ltd v Cabra Estates plc 1994 1 BCLC 363; 1992 BCC 863.
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policy and hence unenforceable. Simultaneously there would ordinarily be no claim 
for damages should a director vote contrary to the instructions of the shareholder 
who appointed him. As can be seen, this is neither a relationship of agency nor is 
there any relationship of mandate. In theory the director has no relationship with the 
appointing shareholder which one could argue gives rise to any legal duties between 
the two.
The other important question to ask is about policy. The whole point of investing 
in a company as a shareholder, whether juristic or natural, is limited liability. 
Shareholders are allowed by law to insulate their personal assets from the debts of 
the company in which they invest. There are arguments that limited liability should 
be less of a policy consideration in respect of delictual liability than contractual 
liability. There are a number of authors in the economics sphere who state that 
limited liability in the law of delict is not efficient.42 Since the inception of company 
law, however, limited liability is disregarded only in exceptional cases, ie the 
piercing of the veil cases. Morgan tries to argue that vicarious liability of a parent 
company in the context of a tort by a subsidiary does not violate the principle of 
limited liability.43 His argument is not convincing, however, because the sole basis 
for this argument is that if a natural person or a juristic person can be held liable for 
the tort of a natural person, why can the same not be true where the wrongdoer is a 
juristic person?44 The problem with this argument of course is that Morgan fails to 
take into consideration the relationship between the shareholder and the wrongdoer. 
He fails to recognise that there is a unique relationship between a shareholder and 
the company in which he invests. The shareholder is merely an investor.
This brings me to the question I posed above about the relationship between the 
holding company or any (controlling) shareholder who appoints a director to a board 
of a company. This is complicated where the holding company is simultaneously 
the employer of the director. When one compares the Kuwait Bank case with the 
two South African cases of Van der Berg and the Public Investment Corporation, 
it would at first blush appear that those two cases could open the door to vicarious 
liability, but is this so? It was important for the court in the Van der Berg case that 
Lane was a director and employee of Republic Trustees, his remuneration as trustee 
was paid to Republic Trustees, and he used their infrastructure to perform his duties 
as trustee. The court stated: “At all material times Lane was not only engaged in 
carrying out his duties as a trustee, he was also engaged in carrying out functions 
on behalf of Republic Trustees.”45
The court therefore seemingly ignored the fact that his duties as trustee were 
statutory in nature and subject to creditor control. The court however emphasises 
the fact that while Lane was performing his duties as a trustee, he simultaneously 
carried out his duties to Republic Trustees.46 The fact that Lane had a discretion as 
trustee was not sufficient to exempt the employer from liability.47 The question of 
control was also important to the court. Republic Trustees failed to show that the 
exercise of his duties as trustee “took Lane out of the category of employee”.48
42 See Hansmann and Kraakman “The essential role of organizational law” 2000 The Yale Law Journal 
387 431. See further Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull “An economic analysis of limited liability in 
corporation law” 1980 Toronto Law Journal 117.
43 Morgan (n 28) 297.
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The PIC case is also peculiar. The statement of that court that the employee 
who served as non-executive director on the boards of companies in which the PIC 
invested did so as an employee of the PIC cannot be correct. Unless the constitutional 
documents of those companies provided for persons other than shareholders to 
appoint directors, only shareholders could appoint directors. When the PIC therefore 
placed Bodigelo on the boards of those companies, it did so as shareholder of those 
companies and not because of any other capacity to make those appointments. The 
fact that the PIC received the non-executive directors’ fees is also peculiar, because 
shareholders are not remunerated for services rendered by their appointee directors.
However, one should probably be mindful to compare the Kuwait Bank to the PIC 
case. In the PIC case it was the business of the PIC to invest in companies. Where 
it therefore deploys directors to companies, those directors do advance the interests 
of the PIC. This raises the question whether the business of the holding company/
employer is relevant to determine vicarious liability. Let us imagine two situations. 
In situation A we have a holding company that holds shares in a company that is in 
a totally different business from the business of the holding company. In situation 
B the holding company’s business is either an investment of shares business or the 
business is similar to / the same as the business of the subsidiary. In both cases the 
holding company appoints directors to the board of the subsidiary, which directors 
are employees of the holding company. These directors fulfil their duties on the board 
of the subsidiary during the working hours of the holding company. In both cases the 
decisions by these directors constitute breaches of their duty of care and skill and 
diligence to the subsidiary and the subsidiary wants to hold the holding company 
vicariously liable. Should it matter that the holding company controls the director, 
that the holding company is the entity that has the deep pockets and that the director 
furthers the interest of the holding company during work time? Should it also be 
relevant that in situation A the holding company employer is only an investor in the 
subsidiary, whereas in situation B the business of the holding company employer is 
that of investment or that its business of and that of its subsidiary are closely aligned?
The traditional answer to the above question in both situations would in my 
opinion be the same, ie that the director exercised an independent duty. Even if 
the director followed the instructions of the holding company, he is in breach of an 
additional fiduciary duty to the subsidiary company. The holding company does not 
have a duty to the subsidiary as shareholder and is therefore not in breach of any 
duty. The fact remains that the holding company employer appointed the directors 
to the board of the subsidiary because it cannot itself serve on the subsidiary board. 
It did not make this appointment because of any right contained in the constitutional 
documents of the subsidiary but due to the right as shareholder in the subsidiary. The 
fact that it is the employer of the director is irrelevant, because the director of the 
company does not act as an employee of the holding company when he exercises his 
duties on the board of the subsidiary, even in situation B. There is no employment 
relationship in this context and not even a relationship akin to employment. The 
fact that the director is under the control of the holding company is neither here nor 
there. That would be the case in any appointment of a director. Even if the holding 
company appoints one of its non-executive directors to the board of the subsidiary, 
ie a person who is not an employee of the holding company but where there is some 
form of contractual nexus between the holding company and the non-executive 
director, there is still a form of control over that non-executive director in that the 
director can be dismissed by the shareholder at any time.
Returning now to the ratio in the Kuwait Bank case, the court emphasised the fact 
that there was no agency relationship between the bank and the directors whom it 
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appointed to the subsidiary. The court stated that there could not be any vicarious 
liability, because this would have “serious consequences” for commercial affairs.49 It 
would appear that there is some tension between the principles of labour law and the 
principles of company law. In terms of labour law, the director who is appointed by 
the holding company/employer to the board of the subsidiary exercises control over 
the employee. The holding company also benefits from the decisions of the appointee 
director but also suffers should the subsidiary suffer losses. These benefits or losses, 
however, follow from the fact that the holding company employer is the shareholder 
of the subsidiary, not because of any employment relationship between the holding 
company and the subsidiary nor because of a relationship akin to employment. It is 
purely a relationship of shareholder in a company and the inability to itself serve on 
the board of the subsidiary. The court made much of the question of control in the 
Republic Trustees case. The aspect of control is however a question of labour law, 
not company law. Is this relevant?
From a company law perspective a shareholder is entitled to appoint directors 
to the board of a company. The Companies Act50 provides that at least 50 per cent 
of directors of a profit company have to be elected by the shareholders.51 It follows 
therefore that the holding company, as controlling shareholder, would be able to elect 
the majority/all of the directors of the subsidiary with its majority vote. As illustrated 
in the Kuwait Bank case, this does not constitute a relationship of agency, especially 
when one considers that the holding company, as a juristic person, is disqualified 
from being a director of a company, in this case its subsidiary company.52 It is trite 
that the director has to exercise an unfettered discretion, otherwise he is in breach of 
his fiduciary duty towards the (subsidiary) company. When the director breaches his 
duty of care, skill and diligence to the subsidiary, this is prima facie his own delict 
as a director: it is not a delict as an agent of the holding company/employer, nor is it 
a delict during the course and scope of his employment with the holding company. 
It is a delict of an independent person who is exercising his discretion as a director 
of the subsidiary company.
5 Conclusion
It is trite that in some jurisdictions a person can have two employers. This fact does 
not mean that the person is in the employ of both at the same time. The mere fact 
that a person who is an employee of the holding company and who simultaneously 
serves on the board of the subsidiary, even during the working hours of the holding 
company, does not mean that the person acts as an employee of the holding company 
during that time. This is also true when the person is subject to the control of the 
holding company during that time. This is, however, control of the holding company 
as shareholder, not control as employer. The same control would exist where the 
holding company appointed a non-employee to the board of the subsidiary.
It would appear that the court in the Republic Trustees case made much of the 
control factor and that the onus was on Republic Trustees to show that there was no 
control to take Lane out of the realm of employment when he exercised his functions 
as trustee. It is submitted that this approach should be incorrect in view of the 
arguments of this article. The PIC case also focused on the fact that Bodigelo was an 
49 the Kuwait Bank case (n 2) par 195.
50 71 of 2008.
51 s 66(4)(b) of the Companies Act.
52 s 69(7)(a) of the Companies Act.
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employee of the PIC. A court should bear in mind the two different fields of law, ie 
labour law and company law, to determine the question of vicarious liability which 
falls under the law of delict. It would appear that the courts in both the Republic 
Trustees and the PIC cases focused on the labour law aspects of control to come to 
the conclusion that there was an employment relationship, whereas the court in the 
Kuwait Bank case focused on the company law aspects to come to the conclusion 
that there could be no vicarious liability.
It is a difficult question to answer whether the Kuwait Bank case would still be 
decided similarly today, especially in light of the Republic Trustees and the PIC 
cases. It is submitted that policy reasons should dictate whether vicarious liability 
should be imposed on the holding company. The policy reasons should however 
be a balance between the labour law aspects of control versus the company law 
aspects such as the fact that a corporate shareholder cannot serve on the board of its 
subsidiary and may/has to appoint a natural person to that board. This commercial 
and legal reality has to be borne in mind. The question of possible vicarious liability 
of the holding company that appoints one of its employees as a director on the 
board of the subsidiary, and which director then commits a delict which harms the 
subsidiary, cannot be answered purely from a labour law perspective. The question 
of whether the person was an employee and/or acted in the scope of his duties of 
employment should also be viewed from the company law perspective and it should 
be acknowledged that the employer in this context is the shareholder and not the 
employer.
SAMEVATTING
KUWAIT ASIA BANK EC v NATIONAL MUTUAL LIFE NOMINEES LTD 
HERBESOEK: DIE MOONTLIKE MIDDELLIKE AANSPREEKLIKHEID VAN ’N 
HOUERMAATSKAPPY VIR DELIKTE VAN SY GENOMINEERDE DIREKTEUR OP DIE 
DIREKSIE VAN ’N FILIAAL VAN DIE HOUER
In Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd is beslis dat ’n houermaatskappy nie 
middellik aanspreeklik gehou kan word vir die deliktuele skade, wat sy genomineerde direkteur (wat 
’n werknemer van die houer is) op die direksie van sy filiaal vir die filiaal veroorsaak nie. Die outeur 
ondersoek of hierdie saak nog hedendaags dieselfde beslis sal word. 
In Van der Berg v Coopers & Lybrand Trust (Pty) Ltd skep die hoogste hof van appèl die indruk 
dat daar wel sodanige aanspreeklikheid in die gegewe konteks mag wees. Die outeur toon dat die hof 
in hierdie geval slegs die arbeidsregtelike verhouding tussen die houer/werkgewer en die direkteur/
werknemer oorweeg het om die vraag van middellike aanspreeklikheid te oorweeg sonder om die 
impak van ander regsnorme te oorweeg. In Public Investment Corporation Ltd v Bodigelo noem die hof 
dat ’n direkteur in sy hoedanigheid as werknemer deur die aandeelhouer aangestel is en skep dus ook 
die indruk dat sou sodanige direkteur skade vir die maatskappy, waar hy as direkteur dien, veroorsaak, 
die aanstellende maatskappy middellik aanspreeklik sou wees. 
Die gevolgtrekking wat gemaak word, is dat ’n hof nie die vraag van middellike aanspreeklikheid 
bloot op grond van die diensverhouding tussen die houer en die direkteur kan beantwoord nie. ’n Hof 
behoort ook, soos in die Kuwait Bank-saak, die maatskappyregtelike werklikheid, naamlik dat die houer 
nie ’n direkteur van die filiaal mag wees nie en dus genoop is om ’n natuurlike persoon as direkteur aan 
te stel, te oorweeg. Die verhouding is egter dan nie een van werkgewer/werknemer nie, maar die unieke 
verhouding tussen ’n aandeelhouer en ’n direkteur wat deur die aandeelhouers verkies word. Die toets 
vir middellike aanspreeklikheid kan dus nie net vanuit ’n arbeidsregtelike oogpunt beskou word nie, 
maar ook vanuit ’n maatskappyregtelike oogpunt soos in die Kuwait Bank-saak.
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